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Recent experiments in semiotics and linguistics demonstrate that groups tend to converge
on a common set of signs or terms in response to presented problems, experiments which
potentially bear on the emergence and establishment of institutional interactions. Taken
together, these studies indicate a spectrum, ranging from the spontaneous convergence
of communicative practices to their eventual conventionalization, a process which might be
described as an implicit institutionalization of those practices. However, the emergence of
such convergence and conventionalization does not in itself constitute an institution, in the
strict sense of a social organization partly created and governed by explicit rules. A further
step toward institutions proper may occur when others are instructed about a task. That
is, given task situations which select for successful practices, instructions about such
situations make explicit what was tacit practice, instructions which can then be followed
correctly or incorrectly. This transition gives rise to the normative distinction between
conditions of success versus conditions of correctness, a distinction which will be explored
and complicated in the course of this paper. Using these experiments as a basis, then,
the emergence of institutions will be characterized in evolutionary and normative terms,
beginning with our adaptive responses to the selective pressures of certain situational
environments, and continuing with our capacity to then shape, constrain, and institute
those environments to further reﬁne and streamline our problem-solving activity.
Keywords: experimental semiotics, normativity, conventionalization, communicative practice, institutionalization
INTRODUCTION
Institutions, understood as societal structures constituted and
governed, at least in part, by explicit rules, presuppose a language
in which such rules can be formulated and expressed (Searle, 2005,
2010). This point alone indicates an intimate interrelation between
our institutional and linguistic activities. Yet this dependency on
language might tempt us to picture institutions as somehow mag-
ically created by declarative speech acts, conjured, as it were,
through the incantations of performative utterances. Such a pic-
ture obscures the fact that, prior to the formal declaration of an
institution’s existence and the explicit articulation of its structures
and functions, various practices, customs, conventions, traditions,
etc, comprise the relevant activity that undergoes institutionaliza-
tion. This development is not a matter of mere historical accrual,
but a dynamic process necessary for the evolution of viable insti-
tutions. Understanding the emergence of institutions from tacit
and ﬂuid practices and processes entails disentangling the inter-
play between the informal and formal, the implicit and explicit, an
interplay centrally involving the use of language in different roles
and forms.
Recent studies in semiotics and linguistics offer pertinent
insights into the coordinative and organizing power of language
(e.g., Garrod et al., 2007; Mills, 2013). A broadly evolution-
ary framework guides much of this work, with semiotic and
linguistic communication conceived as adapting to environmen-
tal conditions. These experiments demonstrate that interacting
participants, jointly solving a problem, often in the guise of a
game, are acutely sensitive to the selective pressures of the situ-
ation at hand, converging on common communicative practices
and vocabularies without explicit deliberation or decision con-
cerning these practices (Garrod andDoherty, 1994; Fay et al., 2008;
Mills, 2011). Participants producemanifold communicative forms
in response to the demands of the task, with the task in turn exert-
ing selective pressure on those forms, leading, if successful, to
the survival of those most functionally suited to the problem sit-
uation. Thus a particular situational environment, deﬁned by a
particular problem or set of problems, calls forth and selects for
communicative practices ﬁt for that situation. This basic dynamic
of fecund generation of communicative forms and their functional
selection may be viewed as an engine of specialization, spurring
and honing the specialized vocabularies characteristic of speciﬁc
disciplines.
These themes will be expanded in what follows. We will begin
with a review of relevant experimental work on the evolution of
communicative systems and signs, with special focus on the opti-
mally interactingminds experiments (Bahrami et al., 2010; Fusaroli
et al., 2012), which provide an especially promising experimen-
tal paradigm to explore the role of language in the formation of
institutions. Setting the frame of this ﬁeld of research, we treat
these experiments as a kind of laboratory for larger considerations
concerning communication and coordinative activity. Speciﬁ-
cally, we claim that linguistic interaction within these situations
www.frontiersin.org September 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1057 | 1
Elias andTylén Instituting interaction
is more continuous with technique and action than propositional
representation. This in turn will entail clarifying the notion of
situation as it operates in these experimental settings, which, as a
corollary, will involve critical pressure placed on the idea of sit-
uation models, and whether the ecological concept of affordances
might better explicate the dynamics of joint action within the
constraints of situations (Knoblich and Sebanz, 2008).
The roles of convention and instruction in processes of insti-
tutionalization will then be taken up, as fulcrums enabling the
transition from conditions of success to conditions of correct-
ness, thereby tracing the emergence of institutions in terms of
the transformation of our normative engagements. We start with
the poles of spontaneous coordination and explicit instruction,
which provide a stark way of sketching these normative distinc-
tions. Between these poles, however, lies a continuum involving
convention and conventionalization of communicative practices.
Indeed, the implicit conventionalization of technique, of ways of
going about and accomplishing tasks, points to the establishment
of standards of correctness independent of explicit declaration
and decree (Mills, 2011). A spectrum is thus charted, stretch-
ing from the convergence of communicative practices, driven and
determined by conditions of success, to the development of con-
vention, involving emerging norms of implicit correctness, to the
articulation of instructions, which, for the purposes of this paper,
deﬁnes a kind of endpoint of explicitly stated standards of cor-
rectness. These normative considerations, we emphasize through-
out, are inextricably bound up with differences in linguistic
interaction.
Undergirding the discussion, running through it as a theme,
is a functionalist conception of language as acutely adaptive
communicative activity (Tylén et al., 2010). More generally, this
experimental work exempliﬁes the dynamics of natural languages
as living, evolving systems, teeming in their multifaceted appli-
cations, their various uses and forms, with certain terms and
turns of phrase in turn selected for use in speciﬁc situations,
leading to the development of adaptive vocabularies ﬁt for par-
ticular purposes, and, eventually, to the specialized discourses of
distinct disciplines and institutions. What arises, then, is a view
of communicative activity as environmentally and normatively
sensitive, with selective pressures comprising situations within
which communication may be taken as functional or successful.
And with the gradual development of convention, and the even-
tual introduction of instruction, situations become structured
according to standards of correctness. Institutionalization, then,
is deﬁned by the normative move from selection to sanction of
actions within increasingly intentionally informed environments.
This approach to institutions is consonant with recent turns in
the cognitive sciences (Clark, 2006; Rowlands, 2010; Hutto and
Myin, 2012) in which cognitive capacities are conceived as fun-
damentally environment-involving, as copings and engagements
within the constraints of various environments; as such, this paper
is an attempt to apply these concepts to the processes and dynam-
ics of institutions (Gallagher and Crisaﬁ, 2009; Gallagher, 2013).
From this perspective, much of our large scale social cognitive
activity may be viewed as the deliberate shaping of situations
and environments, with the aim of guiding and cultivating the
activities occurring within them. In shaping and constraining
our environments, we shape and constrain our activities and
ourselves.
SETTING THE SCENE: EXAMPLES AND ELUCIDATIONS FROM
EXPERIMENTAL SEMIOTICS
Recent studies in experimental semiotics have investigated the
evolutionary aspects of semiotic and linguistic communication
(Galantucci,2009; Galantucci andGarrod,2010). However, empir-
ical investigationof the evolutionof natural languages is inherently
problematic, as their evolutionary origins are either difﬁcult to
ascertain or completely inaccessible, and certainly not available for
experimental manipulation. One way experimental semioticians
circumvent this problem is by having participants communicate in
graphical media without recourse to conventional linguistic sym-
bols (Galantucci, 2005; Healey et al., 2007; Dale et al., 2011), for
instance in scenarios similar to the game Pictionary (Garrod et al.,
2007; Fay et al., 2008, 2010). These constraints compel participants
to create symbols from scratch, thereby setting up conditions in
which the evolution of sign and symbol systems can be observed
and analyzed.
In a representative experiment, Garrod et al. (2007) had sub-
jects play a game in which they constructed graphical signs for
a pre-established set of items; the game proceeded through sev-
eral rounds in which players play in pairs, in alternating roles
of drawer and identiﬁer. In conditions allowing for interactional
feedback, participants produced articulated signs based mainly
on iconic resemblance to the referred items. However, through
an evolutionary process the signs tended to become simpliﬁed
and streamlined, reﬂecting a reduction in their iconic or pictorial
character. For instance, in a case from a similar experiment (Fay
et al., 2008), the graphical representation for “parliament,” which
began as a drawing of a chamber with circular benches and stick
ﬁgures facing one another, ended as an abstraction of two par-
tial curves with a single small circle in between (Fay et al., 2008,
p. 3554). While a residuum of iconicity remained, the represen-
tation was no longer identiﬁable by its iconic resemblance to its
referent, and would strike a naive newcomer as completely arbi-
trary. What appears to have happened is that the reference of each
use of the sign became its prior use or tokening: the gradually
streamlined sign no longer referred to the concept “parliament”
directly through resemblance, but rather to previous episodes of
successful communication in the history of the sign’s use; i.e.,
the abstracted partial curves referred to, reminded recipients of,
the more complex representations that occurred before. In other
words, a stepwise process occurred of incremental simpliﬁcation
through repeated use, with each increasingly reduced instance
linked to its predecessor, resulting in thedistillationof anoptimally
efﬁcient form.
Congruent observations have been made concerning natural
languages (Millikan, 2005), supporting the relevance of these
experiments to theworkings of language at large. Andwhile iconic-
ity in verbal language may not be as obviously evident, recent
studies have made the case for its prevalence (Perniss et al., 2010),
suggesting a similar tradeoff between complexly iconic and more
simpliﬁed forms dependent on tacit social coordination and nego-
tiation. Again this speaks to the living and evolving nature of
languages, undergoing change as they unfold and adapt in space
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and time. Indeed these experiments offer something of an artiﬁcial
window onto possible mechanisms underlying the origins of lan-
guage, the conditions under which words are forged and formed,
and in which they must succeed if they are to survive. Further-
more, as inherently historical phenomena, words do not simply
“pick out” their referents in abstract and static one-to-one refer-
ential relations, but rather mean what they do through a temporal
process of reliable reproduction and use, grounded in the com-
mon knowledge that others in the community are participants
in that history. In the experiment above, for example, the sim-
pliﬁcation of signiﬁers ensues precisely because participants trust
that interlocutors will have encountered something sufﬁciently
like the sign in the past, such that they will recognize the short-
hand version on offer. Of course community members do not
need to be familiar with all the historical details of a sign’s use:
what matters is that those in currency are recognizably rooted in
the history of the community in question. With that said, how-
ever, the historical and communal determination of a word’s or
sign’s meaning does not restrict its use to a predeﬁned community,
for the community in question extends to anyone who encounters
and learns its use through interactions with other members. The
historical trajectory of a community’s interactions, and the con-
ventions, expectations and potential ﬁxities that inhere therein,
will be considered further in the course of the paper.
In light of this applicability to language more broadly, rele-
vant experiments are not limited to graphical signs and symbols,
but also demonstrate the adaptation of natural language under
controlled conditions. The aforementioned Optimally Interacting
Minds experimental paradigm explores the evolution of ordinary
verbal language within the constraints of a task situation. Through
a series of trials, two people perform a visual discrimination task
individually; they do so in the same room, each at their own sep-
arate computer. As long as they offer congruent answers (whether
right or wrong) they simply precede to the subsequent trial. How-
ever, if they give divergent answers, they are prompted to verbally
negotiate their joint decision; their linguistic interactions are sub-
sequently analyzed in relation to their performance on the task
(see Figure 1 for a schematic of the Optimally Interacting Minds
experimental setup). The task thus requires dyad members to, on
a trial-by-trial basis, determine who had the more vivid expe-
rience of the visual stimulus contrast and submit that person’s
decision as their joint answer. Results show that well-performing
dyads converged on a common, stable set of terms to communi-
cate conﬁdence, a kind of scale of verbal expressions allowing dyad
members to compare their individual levels of conﬁdence. Impor-
tantly, general linguistic alignment – that is, the indiscriminate
repetition and reinforcement of linguistic forms – failed to pos-
itively correlate with performance. Rather, it was the alignment
of terms functionally relevant to the task at hand – in this case,
conducive to the communication of conﬁdence in discussions of
incongruent answers – that was predictive of performance, point-
ing to the strong context-dependence of linguistic coordination
(Fusaroli et al., 2012).
In this process, of converging on a common communicative
practice, the seeds may be seen of an implicit institutionalization
of a particular approach to solving the presented problem. That is,
dyads tacitly instituted linguistic practices enabling them to better
function as a problem-solving system. However, the emergence
of such convergence does not in itself constitute an institution, in
the stricter sense of a social entity in part created and governed
by explicit rules. While language in this experiment plays a crucial
role in the problem-solving activity, it does not function in the
capacity required for the establishment of institutions proper, i.e.,
by explicit representation or declaration of rules which can be
either obeyed or broken. Rather, the use of language here is more
akin to actions taken in the course of a situation, as opposed to
representations of a situation.
This distinction may be elaborated by the following contrast.
Again, participants in the above experiment communicate their
conﬁdence in their answers in a simple perceptual discrimina-
tion task; such communication drives their decision-making in
direct response to the situation itself, andhence inextricably occurs
within the immediate context of that situation. Successful commu-
nicative practice – here, convergence on a consistent set of terms
to convey conﬁdence – is forged under the selective pressure of
the task at hand: well-performing pairs arrive at a means of com-
municating that works, that meets the demands of the situation
and affords successful coping within that situation. Yet one might
imagine successful pairs informing prospective participants about
the task they faced, the problems they had to address and solve,
and the ways they went about doing so. And perhaps they might
proceed to instruct future subjects in how to go about respond-
ing to this situation, or to situations very much like it. This kind
of communication would occur outside of the pressing pressures
of the task itself; the task is no longer directly responded to but
represented, described, to others. With representations of the situ-
ation, and representations of how to act in the situation, potential
participants would now have something to conform to, namely
depictions of how to complete the task in a particular way, and
something to comply with, namely the instructors’ intention that
they complete the task in accordance with those depictions. Yet
the distinction between descriptions of and prescriptions for actions
must be kept in mind, and while the exact contours of the move
from the one to the other may vary from case to case, some gen-
eral considerations will be sketched and suggested in later sections,
including the human propensity toward imitation (Horner and
Whiten, 2005).
This transition from transient, emergent coordinative activ-
ity to instructions about that activity can serve as an entryway
into instituted practices proper. Given situations which select for
successful communicative practices, instructions about such sit-
uations make explicit what was tacit practice, instructions which
can then be followed correctly or incorrectly. Whereas practices
that evolve in response to the selective pressures of a task may fail
or succeed in relation to the task, instructions create conditions
in which correct and incorrect actions are possible. The com-
municative practices of well-performing dyads in the optimally
interacting minds paradigm can be deemed relatively success-
ful or efﬁcacious, but strictly speaking cannot be considered
correct or incorrect, for no standards of correctness yet exist
concerning those practices; they are not right or wrong per se
but more or less functional with regard to solving the problem
at hand. Instructions, however, introduce standards of correct
practice and action by explicitly representing those practices
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Schematic of optimally interacting minds experimental setup. (B) Progress of sample trial (from Fusaroli et al., 2012).
and actions, and thus give rise to a distinction between condi-
tions of success versus correctness. However, this stark contrast
between implicit practice and explicit instruction, while illustra-
tive here at the outset, belies a more continuous picture involving
the gradual conventionalization of communicative practice, in
which conditions of correctness come into play prior to, and
independently of, the introduction of instruction (e.g., Healey,
2008).
These distinctions, of course, remain coarsely sketched at the
moment; indeed the road from tacit habit and practice to explicit
institution is a crooked and complicated one (e.g., Fleetwood,
2008), and will be treated more thoroughly in what follows.
Moreover, there are certainly cases in which institutional contexts
themselves provide the conditions for the emergence of sponta-
neously responsive practices and actions, and so it would be a
mistake to suggest that the trajectory is necessarily unidirectional.
However, the focushere is not onhow that pathhappens toproceed
in particular cases, but rather on the basic conditions required for
the emergence of institutional structures. Sufﬁce it to say at this
stage that if one were to take these experimental paradigms as
representing some recurring and prevalent set of circumstances,
a task or problem situation that people encounter with sufﬁ-
cient regularity and urgency, then it may be fruitfully treated as a
kind of microcosm of specialization and, if extrapolated further,
institutionalization (Healey, 1997).
Having reviewed some representative examples from this realm
of research, we will now proceed to unpack these preliminary
observations, and take a closer look at particular implications. In
the next section we explicate the notion of situation as it applies
to these experiments, and examine the role of communication
and language therein, a role grounded in the coordination of joint
action as opposed to propositional representation. These consider-
ations concerning language will serve to set up what follows, as we
address the development of coordination, convention, and, even-
tually, instruction, in the emergence of institutional interactions,
further elucidating the normative distinction between conditions
of success versus those of correctness.
COMMUNICATION UNDER SELECTIVE PRESSURES:
SITUATIONS AND AFFORDANCES
Since the concept of situation plays a number of different roles in
a variety of domains, we should take stock of the term as it has
operated in the discussion thus far. As a start, a situation may be
described as a set of circumstances, driven and informed by spe-
ciﬁc human demands and goals, which in turn exerts pressure on
actions performed in accord with those demands and goals. So a
situation, in this sense, is at once constituted by human actions and
feeds back onto them, is both determined by and determining of
those actions. A situation, then, may be provisionally deﬁned as a
humanly comprised selecting environment, within which actions
may succeed or fail to meet the needs or demands fueling the
unfolding of the situation; actions that succeed are selected for,
while those that fail are selected out. Of course this is something
of an idealization: failed and failing actions often persist despite
their repeated failure, for various reasons. For current purposes,
however, the idea of a situation as, in principle, determining con-
ditions of success or failure will serve to set the stage for what
follows.
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In the experiments presented above, communication occurs
precisely under such pressing and pressured conditions. In these
contexts, the situation is constituted by particular tasks or
problems, which participants attempt to address or solve in the
course of their activity. Communication here serves to coordinate
the joint decision-making of the participants, driving and shaping
their actions as the situation unfolds in time. Put more strongly,
the communication might be said to comprise the situation as a
kind of cohering glue, coordinating the participants and partly
constituting their joint activity (Demichelis and Weibull, 2008).
That is, communication may be conceived as continuous with
actions taken within the currently occurring situation, as actions
subject to conditions of success or failure, as opposed to proposi-
tions characterized by conditions of truth or falsity. While we will
not attempt to conclusively argue this point here, in this section
we suggest ways in which language may be operating in these set-
tings, as opposed to simply assuming and imposing a reﬂective,
representational conceptualization.
Returning to the optimally interacting minds paradigm in par-
ticular will help ground some of these thoughts. Recall that
participants adjust and attune their conﬁdence by means of lin-
guistic interaction in order to arrive at a shared decision. Here
linguistic communication may be understood in terms of the
sharing of information, affording access and coupling to the per-
spective, or experience, of one another (Fusaroli et al., 2014a,b).
Thus communication may be viewed as a function of the ﬂow of
information through the decision-making system, as an aspect
of dynamic informational attunement to the situation. Again,
this would be opposed to a view of language as composed of
propositional statements analyzable in terms of direction of ﬁt
to the world (Price, 2013). Rather, the use of language in this
scenario is more aptly conceived in terms of coping, employed in
direct engagement with a situation, in contrast to a conception
of language as somehow standing outside the pressures of a sit-
uation, where participants have the space to model or represent
the situation independently and to manipulate and control that
model.
From this point of view, the status of situation models, deﬁned
as multidimensional representations of currently unfolding situa-
tions (Zwaan and Radvansky, 1998), may be called into question.
Such models are often conceived as internal cognitive repre-
sentations belonging to individuals, and therefore the job of
communication is to coordinate and align the distinct situation
models of the individuals involved. Indeed, Pickering and Garrod
(2004) in their inﬂuential account state that linguistic alignment
on multiple levels of representation leads to the alignment of sit-
uation models. So it seems as if these models are ﬁrst private
and must come to be shared, rather than public and shared from
the start. However, Fusaroli et al. (2014a) proceed to question the
notion of situationmodels, understood as internal representations
which are aligned by linguistic interaction. Furthermore, commu-
nication often is not a matter of simple alignment or matching but
rather the achievement of complementary roles and contributions
in the course of interaction.
Here we suggest two critical replies to the notion of situa-
tion models. On the one hand, language itself may constitute
the situation model: rather than merely facilitating the sharing
and alignment of internal representations or models, the lin-
guistic interaction, the engagement with the public symbols and
artifacts of language, may itself count as the construction and
manipulation of a model of the situation (Clark, 1997). On this
account, the model, or modeling process, is shared from the start,
jointly attended to and co-constructed in the course of commu-
nication within the situation. On the other hand, the situation
itself, to paraphrase roboticist Rodney Brooks, can simply serve as
its own best model (Brooks, 1990). While parts or aspects of the
present situation may be modeled or represented, the situation as
a whole need not be: the situation is simply there, to be attended to
and engaged with. From this perspective, linguistic activity serves
to guide and direct attention and action in the course of unfolding
situations (Richardson and Dale, 2005).
If the situation is directly engaged with during joint activ-
ity, without the mediation of situation models or representations
guiding that activity, then the situation itself must in some sense be
able to direct and constrain that activity. The ecological notion of
affordances seems a good candidate to account for this, though the
term is often subject to loose and various applications. Affordances
in the original Gibsonian sense (Gibson, 1977) are functional rela-
tions between an organism and the environment it encounters,
and hence do not need to be represented and imposed upon the
environment. Objects in the environment are perceived in terms of
the abilities of an organism to interact with those objects (Greeno,
1994). Thus a pen is perceived by a grown adult in terms of ﬁne
motor control by the ﬁngertips; however, an infant who has not
yet acquired such ﬁne motor control will not perceive the pen in
those terms, but would instead perhaps perceive it as something
to grab by the ﬁst and place in its mouth. Affordances then are
dependent on the abilities of the perceiver, and those abilities may
be in various states of development and transition, with blurry
boundaries in between. Therefore the line between what can or
cannot be donewith an objectmay be vague and subject to change;
affordances are therefore dynamic in relation to a perceiver’s
abilities.
Furthermore, while affordances may be understood in this
fairly restricted sense of direct bodily engagement with objects –
e.g., an object as being graspable in a certain way – the concept
is also often applied to possibilities for action more broadly. Here
again the line may not be absolutely clear: one perceives a cup as
affording drinking from because one perceives it as affording being
grasped in a certain way, a grasp which itself only takes shape in
the course of a goal-oriented action such as drinking (Garbarini
and Adenzato, 2004). Moreover, there is the question of extending
the concept to situations more broadly (Chemero, 2003). That is,
given the multiple constraints of a particular situation, can it be
said to afford certain possibilities for action? If so, then norma-
tive considerations will have to enter in, as the range of possible
actions within a situation depend not only on the abilities of the
actors and the physical features of the objects at hand, but also on
a sense of what actions ought to be taken given the situation, as
well as which courses of action are better than others. The issue
remains, however, whether the possibilities for action themselves
need to be represented or modeled in some sense, and if so, how
such models might be conceived. So it may be said that the notion
of affordances affords a range of applications; yet determining
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when a concept is being extended, or an ambiguity exploited, can
be a difﬁcult matter. A more extended exploration of affordances,
however, is beyond the scope of this paper; for the moment we
may say that the concept offers a possible alternative to the preva-
lent notion of situation models, and furthermore may motivate
a non-representational conception of communication, i.e., a con-
ception of communication as a form of joint action facilitated
by the affordances of unfolding situations, rather than necessar-
ily dependent upon or bound up with representations of those
situations (Hodges and Fowler, 2010).
As the concept of affordances predominantly applies to inter-
actions with physical objects and artifacts such as tools, it is worth
exploring its potential applications to social and symbolic arti-
facts such as language. Firstly, with a physical tool, an individual
in isolation can, in principle, learn and effectively use the tool;
the presence of other people is not, logically speaking, required
(though of course an individual may encounter physical limita-
tions in attempting to perform a task alone, but that is a separate
matter). A single person can rely on and respond to the affor-
dances of the tool – the fact that it is graspable and manipulable
in this or that way – and exploit its physical features in interacting
with the environment, such as a sharp stick affording throwing
while hunting (Heft, 1989). And the standard by which the use
of the tool may be deemed successful or not is the intention of
the tool user herself, what the user intends to do or accomplish
with the tool. A person might intend to use a ﬂat head screwdriver
to pry open a jar, and may succeed or fail in the act depend-
ing on whether the tool is ﬁt for the task. But while a particular
individual may set her own standards in the use of a tool, the
same may not be said for the use of language, for the success of
communication depends on whether or not one is understood by
others (Davidson, 1992). The standards for successful commu-
nication are not set individually but communally (Wittgenstein,
1953/2001). So insofar as it makes sense to speak of affordances
with regard to language, of the possibilities for action that certain
words in certain situations afford, a social dimension must nec-
essarily be included. The communication occurring in the above
experiments, for example, takes place within the context of joint
activity coordinated by common goals, so actors may fulﬁll or fail
the intentions of others as well as their own. Yet there is a distinc-
tion between failing with others and failing others; that is, there
is a subtle but signiﬁcant difference between failing jointly with
another versus failing another. The latter perhaps implies a power
relation of some sort, or at least a distinct stance toward the activity
in question, in which the intention of the other must be complied
with.
In the following section these normative considerations will be
elaborated, in terms of the distinction between conditions of suc-
cess and conditions of correctness, with uses of language serving as a
shifting hinge fromone to the other. Our aim in this section,mean-
while, has been to suggest a view of language use under pressured
situational constraints, as an alternative to a thoroughly propo-
sitional conception. While we don’t pretend to have presented
a full account, we have offered possibilities in terms of affor-
dances and joint action, with linguistic communication affording
informational coupling and coordination within a dynamically
interacting system.Adeclarative, propositional picture of language
may appropriately apply, however, in cases of explicit instruction
and compliance therewith. These different uses of language reﬂect
different ways of relating and interacting within and between
situations, differences we explore in the remainder of the paper.
NORMATIVE DISTINCTIONS AND DISCRIMINATIONS:
CONVENTION, INSTRUCTION AND INSTITUTION
In previous sections we have introduced a normative dichotomy
between conditions of success versus conditions of correctness. In
this section we further specify these distinctions, and complicate
the discussion with consideration of processes of convention and
conventionalization. We set the stage with a brief recap of the opti-
mally interacting minds paradigm, to help ground what follows in
a speciﬁc concrete case. Recall that pairs that performed better on
the visual discrimination task tended to converge on a common
vocabulary to communicate relative conﬁdence in their answers:
some pairs converged on a conﬁdence scale comprised of visual
terms, as in “I think I saw” and “I did not see anything,” while
others were voiced in terms of sureness, as in “I’m almost sure”
and “I’m absolutely sure” (Fusaroli et al., 2012, p. 4). Ultimately
the type of scale used did not matter, as long as they came to tacitly
share a consistent practice of communicating their levels of con-
ﬁdence in negotiating a joint response. Thus the demands of the
task exerted pressure on participants to communicate in a way that
enabled them to fulﬁll those demands. That is, the experimental
setup constituted a selecting environment, comprising a situation
deﬁned by conditions of relative success and failure, driving the
evolution of actions and practices in accordance with those con-
ditions. Given this situation, participants came to develop a viable
vocabulary, speciﬁcally honed to cope with the task at hand. Again,
here as well as in the other experiments mentioned, feedback and
interaction were crucial to the development of these convergent
patterns, which arose from the dynamics of the interaction over
time, rather than the explicit intentions of the individuals involved
(Fusaroli et al., 2014b).
It should be made clear, however, that it is the normative
character of the practices themselves that is under question, the
normativity internal to the practices. This point is important since
participants in a paradigm like optimally interacting minds receive
feedback from the experimental setup as to whether their replies
are correct or incorrect. Yet this is a matter of the reinforcement
provided by the environment, and hence is external to the par-
ticipants’ practices under those conditions, however much those
practices develop in response to that environment. That is, regard-
less of how the environment feeds back onto and constrains their
actions, the actions themselves cannot, under the circumstances,
be deemed correct or incorrect, but only more or less successful in
adjusting to that feedback and meeting the demands of the task;
there are as of yet no standards of correctness in place, and so no
way to say that this and not that particular practice is correct. In
other words, while correctness of outcome may be said to be in
place, in the sense of the right aim or end to be achieved, there is
no question of correctness of practice as of yet. At this point, the
means to be taken remain open, as long as the end is achieved:
given a goal, whatever methods or tools that may bring about
that goal are acceptable. In this sense the conﬁdence scales arrived
at in the optimally interacting minds paradigm are tool-like, in
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that it does not matter which type of scale (e.g., whether in the
vocabulary of “vision” or “sureness”) is used, as long as they work
to meet the same end; thus they demonstrate the detachability of
means from ends characteristic of purely tool-like or instrumental
relations.
However, the normative status of this coordinative practice, its
basic instrumental character in terms of pure conditions of suc-
cess or efﬁciency, may quickly become transformed in the course
of development. We’ve noted that arriving at a consistent commu-
nicative practice is crucial for successful performance. It is then
perhaps a short step from this convergence of coordinative prac-
tice to the eventual routinization and conventionalization of such
practice. Though a speciﬁc procedure may not be explicitly estab-
lished, procedural routines may emerge and establish themselves
in the course of repeated and continual interaction, procedures
that may be diverged from or violated, and recognized as having
been so violated. So it may be that the idea of a starting stage in
which there is, strictly speaking, no right or wrong way of going
about, where it is purely a matter of whatever works in the con-
text of the task, may be something of an idealization, or at the
very least a highly transient phase which undergoes rapid trans-
formation. In other words, though these normative distinctions
are conceptually extricable, in the course of actual practice they
may well blur together from the very beginning.
A relevant example is found in an experiment by Garrod and
Doherty (1994). Here participants jointly navigated a set of mazes
either in “isolated pairs” playing together through repeated tri-
als or in “speech communities” where participants would change
partner from trial to trial within a closed community. The task
was constructed in such a way that participants had to give each
other directions and indicate positions in the mazes. They thus
had to converge on ways of linguistically referring to positions and
routes. Initially participants would generally rely on quite con-
crete ways of talking about positions in the maze, for instance
by reference to the mazes’ ﬁgurative properties or by describ-
ing the route one would need to go to reach a critical position.
However, in the course of the experiment some participant pairs
would evolve more abstract coordinate systems (e.g., the chess-
like matrix system of specifying a column and row index such as
A1 or 3.4) that, once established, proved very effective and trans-
ported well between different shapes of mazes. Again, not unlike
the reduction of iconicity in previous examples, this development
seems to proceed from reliance on the concrete instantiation of
the single maze toward a more abstract scheme applicable to all
mazes despite their individual shapes and differences. Interest-
ingly, speech communities were more inclined to converge on
this more optimal strategy than isolated pairs. Furthermore, and
of particular relevance here, in community groups the matrix
scheme tended to become conventionalized: the matrix scheme
was thus applied even in cases that lend themselves to a more
ﬁgurative strategy (see also Tylén et al., 2013). That is, even in sit-
uations in which a ﬁgurative approach would have provided an
easier means of reference and direction, the more abstract matrix
scheme was nevertheless adhered to. While, in early trials, adapta-
tion to the concrete perceptual stimulus is driving joint linguistic
behavior, in later trials the gradual establishment of shared “pro-
cedures” comes to override local stimulus affordances: a practice,
arising from and rooted in a history of communal interaction,
comes to be entrenched and imposed upon the current situation.
Still, at this stage, this gradual process of conventionalization
proceeds implicitly and only becomes apparent to participants
if violated.
This latter point is especially evident in an experiment investi-
gating the development of procedural conventions in a coordina-
tion task involving the arrangement of actions and utterances in
a certain order (Mills, 2011). Again, participants were organized
into small communities, though in this case they communicated
by means of a text chat tool. While the referential aspects of the
task were made trivial, the experimental situation afforded the
evolution of procedures for how and when to share information
and coordinate actions. Each participant started with their own
list of words, which was not viewable by others. The task was then
to submit words from their own list in the formation of one shared
alphabetically ordered list. However, they also could not view the
submissions of the other. Thus participants had to both commu-
nicate their words and to converge on procedures for informing
each other which words had already been submitted, and when it
was the other’s turn to submit a word. In the course of the exper-
iment, communication within groups grew increasingly arbitrary
and rareﬁed, with progressively abbreviated utterances positioned
inhighly speciﬁedpoints in the interactions, theirmeanings, again,
determined by the particular histories of those particular commu-
nities. These conventional patterns were built up without explicit
agreement, emerging from what allows for successful completion
of the task, solutions which were then repeatedly taken up, reﬁned,
and rendered more efﬁcient.
However, these patterns became explicitly apparent in a crit-
ical last trial, where, unbeknownst to the participants, the chat
tool would pair up members from half of the communities with
partners from different communities: suddenly participants expe-
rienced that all the subtle, tacit routines that have evolved with
their partners through the course of the preceding trials were
violated, bringing them into explicit attention. The manipula-
tion yielded a dramatic drop in performance and participants
performed signiﬁcantly more self-corrections. These observations
point to a kind of intermediate stage on the path toward fully
instituted practices: despite the highly implicit nature of the inter-
active procedures, the reactions to violation indicated an emerging
normative dimension. For example, one pair of participants may
have established a routine in which they would trade turns by
indicating the next item for their partner to submit. Mean-
while, another pair may have evolved a tacit routine in which
participants would inform their partner which item they had
just themselves submitted. When, in that critical last trial, par-
ticipants relying on such different procedures are unknowingly
brought together, their procedures break down revealing their
emergent normative character (see Table 1 for transcript exam-
ple from Mills, 2011). For instance, in the transcript example
below, Participant 2 is expecting to be told which item Partic-
ipant 3 has just submitted; instead Participant 3 is naming an
item that is on Participant 2’s list, thereby following a very dif-
ferent routine. Participant 2’s reaction in line 5 indicates that the
breakdown of collective routine is experienced not primarily as
unsuccessful in meeting task demands, but as wrong in a socially
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Participant3 Yeah of course
Participant2 WHAT?
normative sense. That is, the exchanges spoke to the violation of
norms of interaction, and not merely a struggle with an unfamiliar
vocabulary.
Cases in which convention overrides local considerations of
efﬁciency and functionality demonstrate the dissociation of con-
ditions of success and functionality from those of correctness.
In other words, they indicate the implicit establishment of a
certain way of doing things that is not treated merely as an instru-
mental means to some end. This conventionalization of practice,
therefore, opens space for a tacit, emergent sense of correctness
independent of explicit instruction. It appears that the historical
momentum of social interaction to some extent takes precedence
over immediate considerations of efﬁciency and functionality.
Though of course in these situations social interaction is itself a
signiﬁcant factor, speciﬁcally in terms of the mutual expectations
of community members. So while this ﬁxity or conformity of
practice may seem in certain speciﬁc cases to be inefﬁcient or even
detrimental, this conformity may prove functional overall to the
extent that sociality itself becomes a major factor in the problem-
solving system. That is, there may exist a trade-off between
immediate instrumental efﬁciency and the historical entrench-
ment of social expectations. Thus the satisfaction of expectations
in the course of an activity may override considerations of local
affordances.
A revealing ambiguity with the term expectation is perhaps
worth noting here. On the one hand, it may reﬂect a neutral atti-
tude toward likelihood or probability, as in I expect it will rain this
afternoon. This sense is evident in the contrast between desiring
versus expecting something to be the case. On the other hand, it
can be used to express an evaluative attitude, as with the expec-
tations one may hold for oneself. The question, then, is whether
the relevant social expectations are to be understood in terms of
adjustments to statistical regularities, to what is likely to happen
given particular conditions, or if they are to be understood in the
normative sense of what should happen, of how others ought to act
in particular situations. Though these senses of expectationmaybe
conceptually discriminated, they may effectively become blurred
in the course of actual interaction.We raise this point not to resolve
it here, but to suggest that humandispositions toward social adher-
ence and cohesion may play a role in infusing expectations with
normative force (Miceli and Castelfranchi, 2002).
For example, the human proclivity to imitate may be a factor
in the establishment and normalization of means and proce-
dures. It is well established that human infants, in contrast to
chimpanzees, faithfully imitate the observed actions of another
even if some of those actions are manifestly not required for
the completion of the demonstrated task (Horner and Whiten,
2005). Whereas chimpanzees disregard irrelevant actions for the
sake of efﬁciency, human children imitate in full despite the cost
in efﬁciency. This tendency to over-imitate, which may have
evolved as a channel for the transmission of cultural knowl-
edge (McGuigan et al., 2011), may drive the move from a merely
instrumental relation of means to ends to a more conventional-
ized determination of means and methods. This is one among
many cognitive biases that imbue observed behavior with a
normative status (Csibra and Gergely, 2009), skewing human
development toward conventionality and heightened sensitivity
to norms.
In contrast to tacit convention, however, standards of correct-
ness may be explicitly created when others are instructed about the
task. With the introduction of instructions, actors are expected
to comply with the intention of the instructors to have the task
accomplished after a certain fashion, in a certain way. The ques-
tion, then, becomes explicitly one of the right way of going
about, of the correct means and method of performing partic-
ular tasks. Under these conditions, the actions to be taken are,
in signiﬁcant respects, represented by the instructors, represen-
tations which serve as the content of imperatives or commands,
i.e., this is how things are done, this is how you shall proceed. Thus
the standard to be met is no longer just the successful completion
of the task, but of performance according to an explicitly spec-
iﬁed protocol. Experimental studies explicitly investigating these
aspects of normativization and institutionalization are still quite
sparse. However, there are some studies concerning the passing of
instructions about procedures among participants. For instance,
in recent studies on cumulative cultural transmission, participants
acquire a procedure and then have to instruct new participants,
who in turn instruct new participants in a “diffusion-chain”-like
design (see Mesoudi and Whiten, 2008 for a review). In a rep-
resentative study, participants had to work together in groups to
make paper planes that would ﬂy as long as possible or build
the tallest tower of spaghetti (Caldwell and Millen, 2008). Inter-
generational exchange was simulated by gradually replacing group
members with new ones. Successively, new group members were
introduced and invited to contribute to the reﬁnement of cur-
rent practices. While the focus in these studies so far has been
on the accumulation of cultural skill, knowledge, and innova-
tion, such experimental designs can potentially informdiscussions
on the transition from conventional to fully institutionalized
practices.
It is with the introduction of instruction, perhaps, that insti-
tuted practices proper come into existence, constituting a kind of
endpoint of the continuum we are considering. In this regard the
dependence of institutions on the declarative force of language
is markedly evident, both in the articulation of representations
of actions to be taken and the articulation of the imperative to
perform them in that way (Gelati et al., 2002). This, again, is
in contrast with the tacit use of language explored in previous
sections, where linguistic interaction serves to guide and coordi-
nate joint action in the course of a situation. By comparison, with
the representing power of language, explicit rules may be formu-
lated that can be either obeyed or broken, correctly or incorrectly
followed. Thus tracing the normative transition from implicit
practices to explicit instructions is a matter of discriminating the
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different ways language operates in relation to situations, includ-
ing how communication both indicates and determines relations
of power between people. For instance, as to the source of the
power to enforce instructions, as to what enables a person to be
in the position to communicate instructions about some course
of action, such authority may be derived, at its origins, from
knowledge and experience directly (e.g., Kruglanski et al., 2005):
the instructors, presumably, know how to go about addressing
the problem at hand, having accomplished the task themselves,
which justiﬁes their formulation and delivery of instructions.
Thus knowledge here is the primary authority, whether practi-
cal (knowing how) or propositional (knowing that), which gives
instructors the right to speak on the matter, and to not only
describe but prescribe actions. An alternative developmental story
can be spun of community members describing and discussing
ways of going about, arriving at a consensus rather than a hier-
archical execution of orders. In this context the role of written
language can be seen as especially relevant and stabilizing, invest-
ing instructions and declarations with a seemingly permanent,
impersonal authority, in contrast to oral commands, conveyed
by the impermanent speech of particular persons (Tylén and
McGraw, 2014).
INSTRUMENT AND INSTITUTION
A key theme threading through the discussion above, which we
address directly in this section, is the instituting of speciﬁc means
to achieve an end, whereby those means become a way of going
about. This notion is similar to the Searlian by-way-of relation
(Searle, 2010): while one may, say, ﬁre a pistol by means of pulling
the trigger, one votes in an election not merely by means of but
by way of the ballot box. The pulling of the trigger contributes
causally to the pistol’s ﬁring; by contrast, submitting a ballot itself
counts as the very act of voting, and is not to be understood as an
instrument toward some separate end. But whereas for Searle such
institutional facts necessarily depend on collective beliefs, we treat
the selection and institution of practices in terms of their gradual
and tacit establishment, a process driven by human disposition
and action as opposed to propositional attitudes.
Central to this process, we claim, is the emergence of an implicit
sense of correctness above and beyond instrumental success, which,
as discussed earlier, may arise through conventionalization. With
convention, a certain pattern of practice is established, by virtue
of which deviation is possible; establishing a pattern enables the
possibility of breaking it. Though again, in the case of human
interaction, such a pattern isn’t a matter of simple statistical regu-
larity, of the assessment of, and adjustment to, probability: rather
there is a normative character to the persistence of the pattern
and the expectation inhering therein (Miceli and Castelfranchi,
2002). This is particularly the case with communicative practices,
given the necessary involvement of, and negotiation with, oth-
ers. And as we hope has been demonstrated by our review above,
conventions need neither be explicitly established nor explicitly
acknowledged: neither the origin of nor the adherence to con-
vention requires explicit deliberation. Rather responsiveness to
convention may be seen as akin to a kind of perception, as a
sensitivity to temporally extended patterns of interaction, a sen-
sitivity cultivated by participation in those patterns. Through this
recognition of patterns comprised of communal histories of inter-
action, a tacit sense of correctness is instituted, a sense of a more or
less right way of doing something, relative to the community one
engages in.
Establishing conditions of correctness has a number of signif-
icant implications. Firstly, when a particular means of achieving
an end has been established as a way of accomplishment, as a style
of doing characteristic of a community, such instituted activity
can become an “object,” so to speak, of joint attention, a tempo-
ral structure around which to coordinate. Conventions, as reliable
patterns of interaction, can serve as coordinative structures in the
course of an activity, facilitating its ﬂow (Alterman and Garland,
2000). One effect, then, of conventionalized practice is to simply
make interactions more streamlined and efﬁcient in this manner.
Secondly, and perhaps more profoundly, conditions in which
it makes sense to say that this or that act is correct, beyond how
successful it might be, enables the conveyance and detection of
signiﬁcance in a way that mere instrumentality wouldn’t allow.
For, if conditions and considerations of success, solely and strictly
speaking, were all that were in play, then, in principle, any change
of procedure, any alternate act taken in the course of some goal,
would be treated instrumentally as merely another means toward
that goal. Whether these changes would prove ﬁt for purpose is
another question: some may be tossed aside as inefﬁcient or unfea-
sible, which speaks to their instrumental dispensability. Since no
grip exists in the means themselves, they would be in principle
interchangeable, assessable only in terms of their instrumental
success, their status as mere means to an end. There would be
no sense of different means meaning different things, as they
would all be deﬁned by the goal-driven constraints of the given
situation.
However, if correctness of practice is established, if the means
are in some sense ﬁxed, and become a way, then variation may
be treated as violation, divergence deemed deviation. Under such
conditions, difference in action may take on special signiﬁcance,
beyond being another means to be dispensed with or disposed of.
This, again, is bound up with the transformation from instrumen-
tal to instituted practice. For, with instituted practices, conditions
in addition to those of success are introduced, enabling a fur-
ther sensitivity to differential activity. The question becomes one
not only of outcome or goal, but of the character of the practice
itself. And when actions are no longer only means in relation to
an end, no longer determined solely by their aim, variation can
become meaningful within and against such instituted patterns
of interaction. This is not to say that change of practice, under
these conditions, isn’t possible, but that such change would be
treated, at least initially, as a violation of current norms of inter-
action. Change would thus undergo some normative process of
negotiation, whether explicit or implicit, and not just practical
adjustment, which speaks to an important dynamic between ﬁxity
and ﬂexibility of practice. This is also not to say that conditions
of success and correctness are somehow opposed or separate: they
are very much interrelated, and our concern here has been their
conceptual disentanglement, however much they may be a tangle
in fact.
These themes are especially pertinent to linguistic interaction.
Many have noted the necessity of conditions of correctness for
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linguistic meaning. Consider, for instance, the centrality of nor-
mativity in the work of Wilfred Sellars (e.g., Sellars, 1956/1997),
for whom the establishment of norms of correctness is crucial
to our capacity for conceptual thought and our operation in the
“space of reasons.”Consider as well the work of Donald Davidson,
for whom conditions of correctness and truth are central to the
very possibility of thought and content (Davidson, 2005). In the
essay “Truth Rehabilitated,” Davidson speculates on an infant’s
growing entry into language. In the early learning stages, the
child, he says, “is still a pragmatist” (Davidson, 2005, p. 15),
concerned with the consequences of its vocal behavior, whether
in the form of reinforcement from others, or in the attempt to
attain something through others. From the perspective of the
teacher, already a master of the language, the child is being taught
the meanings of words and phrases; from the point of view of
the child, linguistic engagement is purely a matter of result and
outcome. It is with the dawning awareness of the possibility of
being mistaken, that this or that word may be applied correctly
or incorrectly, that the child starts to have a sense of the mean-
ings of the words being used. For this possibility for error is not
merely a matter of failure: a word is wrong not because it some-
how fails to work on some occasion. Rather a word is right or
wrong because its use has been established or instituted as such.
There is much more to be said on this subject, of course. Sufﬁce
it to say that, with the introduction and institution of correctness,
the instrument of language is no longer merely instrumental but
intrinsically meaningful, in its sensitivity to correctness and the
violation thereof.
Here we should acknowledge the use of natural language in
many of the experiments reviewed, and hence the prior presence of
conditions of correctness. Thus the normative transitiondescribed
above, from conditions of success to correctness, occurs within a
frame inwhich abasic sense of correctness is already inplace. How-
ever, a distinction may be made between the material of language
itself, conditioned by conditions of correctness, and the particu-
lar linguistic practices that develop from that material. The latter
may be more or less successful depending on the situation, and
may themselves come to be instituted as correct communicative
practice. In this light the emergence of communicative practices
may be viewed as recapitulating the transition from conditions of
success to those of correctness characteristic of the institution of
language itself.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we’ve traced the emergence of coordinative, con-
ventional, and institutional interactions in terms of the trans-
formation of our normative engagements, a process inextricably
involving variations in linguistic and communicative practice.
This instituting of communicative practice provides a conspic-
uous opportunity to investigate the variety and interdependence
of our normative relations. A normative context must exist for this
process to get a grip, a setting inwhich success or failure is possible,
selecting for certain words and communicative forms that work,
which are functionally suited to a problem situation. The tools of
ordinary language are brought to bear to address a problem, and
reﬁned and retooled in the process, forging a vocabulary transi-
tioning from the everyday to the specialized, from the common to
the honed for the task at hand. And with the emergence of con-
vention and the introduction of instruction comes an instituted
environment that not only selects but sanctions certain actions,
constituting a signiﬁcant normative shift in social organization.
In charting this course from conditions of success to those of
correctness, we started with the stark contrast between implicit
coordination and explicit instruction, in order to clearly intro-
duce and elucidate the normative distinction. We then explored
the continuum between these two poles, in the form of the emer-
gence of convention and the establishment of tacit standards of
correctness. We also touched on potential dissociations between
the two, both in the sense of conditions of success existing prior
to and independently of correctness, as well as the possibility of
conditions of correctness coming apart from those of success. The
latter is evident, and perhaps familiar, in the case of practices and
procedures, deemed or instituted as correct, no longer working
efﬁciently; that is, though ofﬁcially considered correct, they may
well have become dysfunctional and unsuccessful.
This normative perspective provides a way of characteriz-
ing processes of institutionalization. From this stance, practices
become instituted when they are established as correct above and
beyond their instrumental success. So while certain practices are
selected under conditions of success, they become instituted under
conditions of correctness, whereby mere means become ways of
doing. And as a terminological aside, perhaps the verb form insti-
tute (as in instituted practices or instituting activities) is more
aptly applied to cases of implicit correctness, in which the pro-
cesses retain a degree of ﬂuidity and informality, whereas the
nominalized institution may be best reserved for social struc-
tures constituted by the articulation and declaration of formal
and explicit rules.
Again, we’ve been keen to proffer a conception of linguistic
interaction as basically coordinative rather than representational.
Such a view points to a role for language in the instituting of inter-
action that does not depend on the idea of declaring institutional
facts into existence, of creating institutional reality by performa-
tively representing it as such. Rather communicative and linguistic
practices enable and facilitate coordinative activities (Maturana,
1978). Furthermore, being essentially social, linguistic practices
may be especially prone to normativization, and hence serve to
consolidate coordination. Indeed these normative transforma-
tions are themselves inherent to language: language by its nature
is a dynamically instituted and instituting phenomenon.
The experimental semiotic frame here surveyed is especially
applicable to these processes, as it treats signs and words as liv-
ing forms within local environments, adapting to the selective
pressures of speciﬁc scenarios and problems, with success and
failure a matter, as it were, of life and death. Hence the emblematic
nature of something like the optimally interacting minds experi-
ment, which serves as a microcosm of the selective environments
that foster adaptive communicative activity. Indeed there appears
to be a kind of double adaptation at work: not only do commu-
nicative and linguistic actions adapt to the task environment, but
people come to adapt to the developing linguistic environment
as well, by aligning with and adopting the communicative forms
employed. Thus a vocabulary develops to adapt to a problem, cre-
ating a linguistic environment which in turn is adapted to. In this
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light institutions can be seen as informed and controlled commu-
nicative environments designed for the consideration and solution
of speciﬁc societal problems.
Crucially, the aims and ends of an institution are themselves
articulated in terms of the language of the institution itself. The
language of an institution to a certain extent constitutes the pos-
sibility of its aims and goals. For example, the possibility of
convicting someone of a crime is constituted by legal institutions:
the legal system, in its institutional articulation, is not merely
an instrumental means of achieving the goal of ﬁnding someone
guilty, but rather constitutes the very possibility of that goal. Lan-
guage in this sense may be viewed as a kind of cultural technology,
enabling the opening up of conceptual possibilities (Clark, 1996).
And while focusing on the tool-like aspects of language may offer
insights (e.g., Tylén et al., 2010), emphasizing the efﬁciency and
instrumentality of linguistic interaction, a focus on the instituting
and institutional aspects of language needs to enter in as well; for
there is a difference between making things easier and making
things possible to begin with.
Finally, the experimental work reviewed exempliﬁes the ways
in which the broader resources of natural language are brought
to bear on certain situations. Indeed, we always ﬁnd ourselves
situated in speciﬁc situations (Gallagher, 2012), which are always
informed to some degree by direction, purpose or functionality,
whether in the form of an explicit aim or goal, or more implic-
itly and indeﬁnitely. Our ordinary language, in its varied and
variegated vocabulary, has evolved, and continues to evolve, in
response to ﬂuid, multifarious circumstances. Just as these exper-
iments illustrate the shaping of communicative activity under the
selective pressures of contrived and controlled experimental con-
ditions, so too has natural language been forged under pressures
to cope with a vast and various range of situations, selected under
shifting conditions of success and failure, with the survival of the
ﬁttest forms for those situations. To articulate the evolutionary
perspective explicitly: words that work live, continuing in circula-
tion and continually reproduced,while those that donotwork, that
fail to serve, die, falling out of use, and no longer reproduced. And
while language adapts to human environments, to situations con-
stituted by human needs, we, of course, adapt to our environment
by way of language, in turn further informing our environ-
ments in the creation and differentiation of our diverse social
milieux.
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